First, Russians have been without capacity to launch massive missile attacks since January, per Kivv and Nato Says, but even more awkward than that is that they denied shooting down a Kinzal last week..

Just Kidding!

It only gets stranger, in videos we can clearly see that multiple explosions were recorded and in a separate video there's even more explosions from what appears to be the place where the AD batteries were seen firing:

KIEV PATRIOT SYSTEM GOES FULL BLAST BUT UNABLE TO STOP THE KINJAL MISSILES DESTROYING THEM
https://www.bitchute.com/video/2ZGbzWQMs6vZ/
It is reported that this footage is from Kiev. According to this telegram channel there may be a hit on the Patriot air defense system.In the video, you can see the extremely dense work of the batteries of the American MIM-104 Patriot air defense system, and as soon as the air defense system runs out of missiles, a powerful explosion occurs at the place where the launches were made.

▫️30 Patriot air defense missile launches.▫️At 01:27 you can watch how two rockets after the launch deviate from the course and rush to the ground.▫️At the end of the video there are 2 explosions at the positions of the air defense deployment.

Clearer Footage of Kinzhal Attack Destroying Patriot Systems
https://www.bitchute.com/video/paRpPOE15Gx4/
‼️💥 Footage of the likely defeat of the Patriot air defense system by the "Dagger" in Kyiv ▪️Apparently, the Russian Army was able to hit the American air defense systems.▪️Patriot fired dozens of missiles last night in an attempt to stop a massive missile attack on targets in Kyiv.▪️The camera in Kiev caught the work of the air defense position area, launches of Patriot missiles (unlike most others, they do not go at a right angle, but at an angle of 40 degrees, as in the video).▪️The video clearly shows how after the exhaustion of rockets, an explosion occurs at 35 seconds and then columns of smoke rise.

Ukraine Says ALL Russian Missiles Intercepted - How Do They Explain This?
https://www.bitchute.com/video/8DXeTL5Y85Yl/
Listen to the end, an American voice in Kiev says he saw it hit exactly where the "anti air" was firing from. Confirmed kill on Patriot missile battery. And since Kiev said that every single missile, including 4 Kinzhals, were intercepted, this proves they lied which means none of their reporting can be taken seriously or trusted.

“Exceptional In Its Density” Attack On Ukrainian Capital
https://www.bitchute.com/video/q056W2UptalL/
The howl of air raid sirens sounds every night throughout Ukraine. March 16 was no exception.
Explosions were heard for several hours in Kiev. The head of the local military administration called the attack on the city "exceptional in its density".

Yet:

Suuuure

Operational history

Persian Gulf War (1991)

Trial by fire

Prior to the First Gulf War, ballistic missile defense was an unproven concept in war. During Operation Desert Storm, in addition to its anti-aircraft mission, Patriot was assigned to shoot down incoming Iraqi Scud or Al Hussein short range ballistic missiles launched at Israel and Saudi Arabia. The first combat use of Patriot occurred January 18, 1991, when it engaged what was later found to be a computer glitch.[75] There were actually no Scuds fired at Saudi Arabia on January 18.[76] This incident was widely misreported as the first successful interception of an enemy ballistic missile in history.

Throughout the war, Patriot missiles attempted engagement of over 40 hostile ballistic missiles. The success of these engagements, and in particular how many of them were real targets, is still controversial. Postwar video analysis of presumed interceptions by MIT professor Theodore Postol suggests that no Scud was actually hit.[77][78] This analysis is contested by Peter D. Zimmerman, who claimed that photographs of the fuselage of downed Scud missiles in Saudi Arabia demonstrated that the Scud missiles were fired into Saudi Arabia and were riddled with fragments from the lethality enhancer of Patriot Missiles.[79]

Failure at Dhahran

On February 25, 1991, an Iraqi Al Hussein Scud missile hit the barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 soldiers from the U.S. Army's 14th Quartermaster Detachment.[80]

A government investigation revealed that the failed intercept at Dhahran had been caused by a software error in the system's handling of timestamps.[81][82] The Patriot missile battery at Dhahran had been in operation for 100 hours, by which time the system's internal clock had drifted by one-third of a second. Due to the missile's speed this was equivalent to a miss distance of 600 meters.

The radar system had successfully detected the Scud and predicted where to look for it next. However, the timestamps of the two radar pulses being compared were converted to floating point differently: one correctly, the other introducing an error proportionate to the operation time so far (100 hours) caused by the truncation in a 24-bit fixed-point register. As a result, the difference between the pulses was wrong, so the system looked in the wrong part of the sky and found no target. With no target, the initial detection was assumed to be a spurious track and the missile was removed from the system.[83][84] No interception was attempted, and the Scud impacted on a makeshift barracks in an Al Khobar warehouse, killing 28 soldiers, the first Americans to be killed from the Scuds that Iraq had launched against Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Two weeks earlier, on February 11, 1991, the Israelis had identified the problem and informed the U.S. Army and the PATRIOT Project Office, the software manufacturer.[81] As a stopgap measure, the Israelis had recommended rebooting the system's computers regularly. The manufacturer supplied updated software to the Army on February 26.

There had previously been failures in the MIM-104 system at the Joint Defense Facility Nurrungar in Australia, which was charged with processing signals from satellite-based early launch detection systems.[85]

Success rate vs. Accuracy

On February 15, 1991, President George H. W. Bush traveled to Raytheon's Patriot manufacturing plant in Andover, Massachusetts, during the Gulf War. He declared, the "Patriot is 41 for 42: 42 Scuds engaged, 41 intercepted!"[86] The President's claimed success rate was over 97% at that point in the war.

On April 7, 1992 Theodore Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Reuven Pedatzur of Tel Aviv University testified before a House Committee stating that, according to their independent analysis of video tapes, the Patriot system had a success rate of below 10%, and perhaps even a zero success rate.[87][88]

On April 7, 1992, Charles A. Zraket of Harvard Kennedy School and Peter D. Zimmerman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank funded by the United States government and Raytheon, testified about the calculation of success rates and accuracy in Israel and Saudi Arabia and discounted many of the statements and methodologies in Postol's report.[89][90] According to Zimmerman, it is important to note the difference in terms when analyzing the performance of the system during the war:

Success rate – the percentage of Scuds destroyed or deflected to unpopulated areas
Accuracy – the percentage of hits out of all the Patriots fired
In accordance with the standard firing doctrine, on average four Patriots were launched at each incoming Scud – in Saudi Arabia an average of three Patriots were fired. The large number of missiles fired suggests low confidence in individual missiles and that a higher rate of successful interceptions was achieved through brute force. For example, if a Patriot has a 50% individual success rate, two missiles will intercept 75% of the time, and three will intercept 87.5% of the time. Only one has to hit for a successful interception, but this does not mean that the other missiles would not also have hit.

The Iraqi redesign of the Scuds also played a role. Iraq had redesigned its Scuds by removing weight from the warhead to increase speed and range, but the changes weakened the missile and made it unstable during flight, creating a tendency for the Scud to break up during its descent from near space. This presented a larger number of targets as it was unclear which piece contained the warhead.

According to the Zraket testimony, there was a lack of high quality photographic equipment necessary to record the interceptions of targets. Therefore, Patriot crews recorded each launch on standard-definition videotape, which was insufficient for detailed analysis. Damage assessment teams videotaped the Scud debris that was found on the ground. Crater analysis was then used to determine if the warhead was destroyed before the debris crashed or not. Part of the reason for the 30% improvement in success rate in Saudi Arabia compared to Israel is that the Patriot merely had to push the incoming Scud missiles away from military targets in the desert or disable the Scud's warhead in order to avoid casualties, while in Israel the Scuds were aimed directly at cities and civilian populations.

The Saudi Government also censored any reporting of Scud damage by the Saudi press. The Israeli Government did not institute the same type of censorship. Patriot's success rate in Israel was examined by the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) who did not have a political reason to play up Patriot's success rate.[citation needed] The IDF counted any Scud that exploded on the ground, regardless of whether or not it was diverted, as a failure for the Patriot. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army, which had many reasons to support a high success rate for Patriot, examined the performance of Patriot in Saudi Arabia.

Both testimonies state that part of the problems stem from its original design as an anti-aircraft system. Patriot was designed with proximity fused warheads, which are designed to explode immediately prior to hitting a target spraying shrapnel out in a fan in front of the missile, either destroying or disabling the target. These missiles were fired at the target's center of mass. With aircraft this was fine, but considering the much higher speeds of tactical ballistic missiles, as well as the location of the warhead, usually in the nose, Patriot most often hit closer to the tail of the Scud due to the delay present in the proximity fused warhead, thus not destroying the missile's warhead and allowing it to fall to earth.

In response to the testimonies and other evidence, the staff of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security reported, "The Patriot missile system was not the spectacular success in the Persian Gulf War that the American public was led to believe. There is little evidence to prove that the Patriot hit more than a few Scud missiles launched by Iraq during the Gulf War, and there are some doubts about even these engagements. The public and the United States Congress were misled by definitive statements of success issued by administration and Raytheon representatives during and after the war."[91]

A Canadian Fifth Estate documentary, The Best Defence,in February 2003 quoted the former Israeli Defense Minister as saying the Israeli government was so dissatisfied with the performance of the missile defense, that they were preparing their own military retaliation on Iraq regardless of U.S. objections[citation needed]. That response was canceled only with the ceasefire with Iraq.

Patriot missile batteries were involved in three friendly fire incidents. On March 23, 2003 a Royal Air Force Tornado was shot down, killing both crew members, Flight Lieutenant Kevin Barry Main (Pilot) and Flight Lieutenant David Rhys Williams (Navigator/WSO). On March 24, 2003, a USAF F-16CJ Fighting Falcon fired a HARM anti-radiation missile at a Patriot missile battery after the Patriot's radar had locked onto and prepared to fire at the aircraft, causing the pilot to mistake it for an Iraqi surface-to-air missile system because the aircraft was in air combat operations and was on its way to a mission near Baghdad. The HARM destroyed the Patriot's radar system with no casualties.[92][93]

Afterwards the Patriot Radar was examined and continued to operate, but was replaced due to a chance that a fragment might have penetrated it and gone undetected.[clarification needed][94] On April 2, 2003, two PAC-3 missiles shot down a USN F/A-18 Hornet, killing U.S. Navy Lieutenant Nathan D. White of VFA-195, Carrier Air Wing Five.[95][96]